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REVIEWS
Michael Strevens. Depth: An Account of Scientific
Explanation. xvii + 516 pp. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2009.∗
Anthony J. Kulic†
Michael Strevens’ Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation is
an impressive recent contribution to the philosophical literature on
explanation. While clearly influenced by several of the leading theories
of the later twentieth century, Strevens’ account is firmly rooted in the
causal tradition, with his most notable intellectual debts in this regard
owing to David Lewis and Wesley Salmon. Still, Strevens sees the
work of these theorists as flawed in important respects and his “kairetic
account” of explanation is meant to provide answers to problems his
predecessors left unresolved (or poorly resolved, as the case may be).
Before examining Strevens’ account we should identify the more significant
of these problems and briefly survey the contexts in which they arose.
Rigorous work on explanation began in the mid-twentieth century
with the Deductive-Nomological (DN) model of explanation. Under the
DN model, an explanandum–a sentence describing the intended object
of explanation–is a consequence of an explanans–a set of sentences
adduced to account for the object of explanation. Furthermore, an
explanans must include at least one statement of scientific law. Hence,
explanation is both deductive and nomological. The DN model remained
the leading account of explanation until critics noted that certain prima
facie acceptable explanations exhibit asymmetric features to which the
DN model is insensitive. For example, consider that using i) a particular
flagpole’s height, ii) its angle relative to the sun, and iii) laws that describe
the rectilinear propagation of light, one can derive iv ) the length of the
flagpole’s shadow. According to the DN model, then, iv is explained in
virtue of a derivation from i, ii, and iii. However, a derivation conforming to
the DN criterion for explanation obtains in the reverse direction, where iv,
iii, and ii, may be used to derive i Yet it is highly counterintuitive to claim
that the reverse derivation explains the flagpole’s height. Counterexamples
like this one expose at least two flaws of the DN model: 1) it is insensitive
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to the asymmetrical nature of certain explanations; and, 2) given 1, the DN
model fails to suitably specify sufficient conditions for explanation. It should
be noted, however, that the former might be resolved via some satisfactory
answer to the latter.
Early attempts at addressing the problem of giving sufficient conditions
for explanation prompted theorists to advance analyses based on
statistical relevance (SR), where sufficient conditions for explanation are
identified with the “difference-making” features that give rise to the event of
some target explanandum. For example, under Salmon’s (1971) SR model
of explanation, statistical relevance is stated as follows: given some class
or population C, a property P2 is statistically relevant to another property
P1 if and only if the probability of P1 conditional on P2 and C is different
from the probability of P1 conditional on C alone.
While undeniably capturing a vital difference-making component of
explanation, the SR model is problematic on various fronts. One of these
concerns certain counterintuitive results with respect to low probability
events. Consider a quantum mechanical explanation for the following
event: a wine glass is knocked from a high countertop to a tile floor
and shatters. Given the nature of quantum mechanical explanation,
the probability distribution for the ‘dropped-glass event’ (i.e. the
difference-maker) functions as the explanans for the shattering event (i.e.
the outcome). This seems correct because the theory predicts the glass
will shatter with high probability. But, recall, the SR model doesn’t impose
a high probability requirement, only a difference-making requirement.
Consequently, the probability distribution for the dropped-glass event
counts as an explanation for each and every outcome in the partition
of possible outcomes. The problem becomes acute when considering
the unlikely outcomes in the partition. For example, in the extremely
unlikely event the glass passed through the floor and emerged in the room
below unperturbed–a phenomenon in quantum theory known as quantum
tunneling–the same probability distribution that “explained” the shattering
event would likewise explain the tunneling event. Hence, under the SR
model, an explanans is capable of supporting both an explanandum and
its negation.
Of the many problems that arise for the SR model of explanation,
perhaps the most serious is its wholesale omission of information
pertaining to causal relationships that seem obviously relevant to scientific
explanation. Recognizing this as a serious weakness, Salmon offered
a reworked account he called the Causal Mechanical (CM) model of
explanation. Under the CM model, to explain some event E is to trace the
causal processes and interactions that give rise to E. But while Salmon’s
CM model seems to ably handle the problem of explanatory asymmetries
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(since CM explanations are strictly unidirectional, from causes to effects),
it falls short of answering the problem of explanatory relevance: i.e.,
which causal processes and events ought to count as relevant to a target
explanandum? Consider, e.g., a collision of curling stones. What licenses
appeal to the moving stone’s linear momentum to the exclusion of other
causal variables as crucial for explaining the stationary stone’s subsequent
movement? Regrettably, Salmon’s CM model doesn’t include a method for
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant causes.
In Depth, Strevens purports to offer an account of explanation that,
among other solutions, resolves the problem of explanatory relevance. At
516 pages the book is a goliath, but its bulk reflects the rigour Strevens
applies to its subject matter. Depth consists of five parts, each of which
focuses on some aspect of Strevens’ ‘kairetic account’ of explanation. His
views related to causality, laws and probabilities are found in parts I, III
and IV, respectively; part II contains his statement of the kairetic account
of explanation for deterministic events; and part V is a comparably short
summation of the main points raised in parts I–IV. Additionally, Strevens
demonstrates how the elements discussed in earlier chapters can work to
solve explanatory problems that arise in the special sciences.
Strevens organizes the book by examining the various aspects
of scientific understanding with an eye to their explanatory structure,
as opposed to their domain of investigation. Hence, explanations
from quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, evolutionary genetics,
medicine and sociology are treated together given their shared
probabilistic structure; likewise, deterministic explanations are treated
together. Since constraints on space preclude a thorough discussion of
each of the book’s five parts, I will instead give a concise overview of
Strevens’ kairetic account. By way of conclusion I offer some commentary
and criticism.
So, why the kairetic account? Oddly enough, Strevens doesn’t provide
an etymology for what is evidently a neologism. However, “kairos” is one
of two terms the ancient Greeks used in reference to the phenomenon of
time. The other, “chronos”, translates as the standard, quantitative sense
of time. “Kairos,” on the other hand, is a qualitative notion that translates as
“an opportune time” or “situational context.” Since temporal considerations
aren’t central to the kairetic account, the name seems apt if Strevens
dubbed it with the latter sense in mind (more on this later).
Strevens’ account of explanation is “ontological” insofar as he takes
explanations to involve the scientific discovery of sets of explanatory facts
about the world, where facts are understood as true propositions, and
where laws and regularities are invoked to derive explanations from facts
(except where laws/regularities are themselves the objects of explanation).
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Strevens places himself squarely in the causal tradition by supposing that
the only relation germane to explanation is causality: “[w]hat explains a
given phenomenon is a set of causal facts... The communicative acts that
we call explanations are attempts to convey some part of this explanatory
causal information (but not just any part...)” (p. 6). Here, the parenthetical
claim alludes to the problem of explanatory relevance–only the causes
relevant to some explanandum matter. So, e.g., seismologists should
ignore facts about the gravitational influence of distant galaxies upon
Earth when they explain why an earthquake occurred. But what principle
determines which causal information we should include and which to
exclude?
Strevens outlines the procedure for constructing a kairetic explanation
as follows:
An attempt at a deterministic kairetic explanation of an event
e begins with a veridical, deterministic, atomic causal model
for e. That the model is deterministic and causal means that
(a) the setup of the model entails the target e, and (b) this
entailment mirrors a real-world relation of causal production.
Such a model is subjected to the optimizing procedure; the
result is an explanatory kernel, a model containing only factors
relevant to the explananadum. A standalone explanation is built
from explanatory kernels. (p. 358)
Although the influence of the DN model is evident here, the principal
difference between the two concerns their respective conceptions of
entailment. While DN explanation is taken as a purely logical entailment
from premises (explanans) to a conclusion (explanandum), Strevens
conceives the entailment relation as wholly causal. His notion of causal
entailment assumes a primitive notion of causal influence, which he
accepts as unproblematic. Causal influence is simply the relation that
obtains between any cause and its effects, with the former bearing
a unidirectional causal influence upon the latter. The entailment thus
derives from the causes in question supporting the right counterfactual
conditionals.
According to Strevens, there are broadly two categories of thing that
will feature in an explanandum: events (i.e., happenings, occurrences)
and laws (i.e. generalizations.) Strevens’ metaphysics of events is
coarse-grained, allowing for high-level events as objects of explanation.
High-level events are abstracted from the specific properties of their
constituent low-level physical entities and events, giving rise to states
of affairs. An earthquake, recall, is an example of the sort of high-level
event/state of affairs that might feature as a target of explanation.
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When investigating earthquakes seismologists needn’t worry about the
behaviour of the particles composing the rock involved in the seismic
activity resulting in the earthquake. Rather, their concerns extend only to
details relevant to an explanation for why the quake occurred; together
these details constitute an explanatory kernel. To get at these details
the scientist chooses a “veridical, deterministic, atomic causal model”
(i.e. a theory, or component model thereof) that posits entities like, e.g.,
tectonic plates that exert a causal influence upon one another. One
should note, however, that the entities appealed to in such explanations
are not themselves objects of explanation, but rather objects of scientific
description. Using the tectonic model, then, the seismologist formulates an
explanation by showing how movements between specific plates causally
entail the quake.
Strevens also applies his kairetic procedure to give an explanatory
account of laws and regularities. When an event E is taken to represent
an instance of some law or regularity L, L is explained by citing the
explanatory kernel of the particular event E (as well as other events like E
taken to exemplify the same law or regularity). However, in order to achieve
the generality required of a law or regularity one needs to eliminate the
initial conditions particular to E. Doing so allows one to derive the causal
mechanism that underlies both the regularity and any instances thereof.
Recall that in order to derive an explanatory kernel the chosen
model is subject to an optimizing procedure. This is notable because
the optimizing procedure dictates sufficient conditions for explaining some
target. Moreover, the optimizing procedure makes sense of Strevens’
decision to name his account “kairetic,” since optimization is applied
to a specific “situational context.” The optimizing procedure is a kind
of filtration process; it eliminates genuine causal influences that, while
influential to some degree, ultimately make no difference to our grasping
the explanation for some event. To borrow a recurring example from Depth,
Mars’ gravitational influence on Earth, while substantial, is irrelevant
to an explanation of Rasputin’s death. On the other hand, facts about
whether he was poisoned, shot, bound and gagged, and thrown into an
icy river certainly bear mentioning. For Strevens, prior to optimization
(and abstraction) an hypothetically comprehensive explanans would make
reference to each and every causal influence on the event referred to
in the explanandum. Optimization thus involves scientists determining
the minimal set of facts sufficient to causally entail the target event
of the explanandum. Consequently, any relevant fact missing from an
explanatory kernel will fail to produce a causal entailment, and the kernel
thereby fails as a standalone explanation.
The most challenging but theoretically rich section of Depth is Part
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IV, where Strevens considers cases in which it seems possible to give
useful probabilistic explanations. According to Strevens, any successful
standalone explanation requires that the model featuring in the explanans
causally entail the event of the explanandum. Hence, “the aim of a
probabilistic explanation is to isolate the causal difference-makers, where
the causal difference making relation is the same high-level causal relation
as in deterministic explanation...” (p. 336). This, of course, requires
considerable unpacking, which Strevens does by providing extended
answers to a series of questions about the formal criteria for probabilistic
explanation. They are as follows: “Can a low probability explain an event?
Do higher probabilities explain events better than lower probabilities? Can
a factor that decreased the probability of an event explain that event?” (p.
336).
There is insufficient space in this review to give even a cursory pass
over the sophisticated answers Strevens provides to these questions. But
it is worth raising a more general conclusion he supports.
Given certain phenomena, scientists will explain/predict outcomes
probabilistically, even when the phenomena in question are assumed to
be deterministic. Classical statistical mechanics and population genetics
are paradigm examples of theories that impose probabilities onto systems
assumed to be governed by deterministic processes (as opposed to, say,
quantum mechanics, whose domain of application is often held to be
irreducibly probabilistic). Since we seem precluded from tracking all the
deterministic causal relations relevant to such systems, probabilities are
introduced for purposes of theoretical and epistemological economy. On
this picture, we formulate predictively useful probabilistic explanations that
capture the difference-making causal relations we’re concerned about, but
we do so at the expense of a maximally precise deterministic account.
Strevens thinks this is false: our foisting probabilities onto deterministic
systems comes at no cost whatsoever. Even if exhaustive deterministic
accounts were computationally tractable, he argues, the probabilistic
accounts are on balance superior. Quite convincingly, Strevens shows that
probabilities must be invoked to explain certain important characteristics
of high-level deterministic systems–characteristics that even a fully
deterministic account would neglect to capture.
This is just one interesting conclusion from a section of Depth that can’t
be given adequate treatment in a review of this length. Suffice it to say,
Strevens’ treatment of the problems arising from statistical approaches
to explanation are superlative. Part IV of Depth is essential reading for
anyone interested in probabilistic explanation.
Although there are potential problems with some aspects of Strevens’
positive account, I want to draw attention to a substantial problem of
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omission that, on my view, limits the theory’s otherwise broad applicability.
In particular, Strevens ignores a kind of scientific explanation that is neither
causal nor irreducibly probabilistic. In fact, Strevens fails to recognize this
form of explanation in the book’s preface, where he acknowledges other
omissions (p. xv). Since this form of explanation isn’t causal, it threatens
the view (one that I’m not certain he fully endorses) that all scientific
explanation must be causally derived.
The kind of explanation to which I refer derives from theoretical physics;
it is a kind of “geometrical explanation” (Nerlich, 1979). On this account,
certain phenomena are best explained by appealing to the geometric
structure of spacetime as specified in General Relativity. Consider, e.g.,
the trajectory of a free particle moving in spacetime. How does one give a
satisfactory “why-explanation” of the particle’s specific trajectory? Since
the free particle travels independent of any force (i.e. it is “field-free”),
and since it isn’t subject to the exchange of some conserved quantity, it
isn’t subject to a causal influence. In such cases physicists advert to the
geometric structure of spacetime to explain its behaviour. Specifically, they
show that the particle’s movement is explained by virtue of its following a
path along a geodesic.
I have offered a summary of Strevens’ excellent book and advanced
a criticism of omission rather than an objection to other potentially
problematic aspects of his positive program. The counterexample I present
constitutes a problem for Strevens to the extent that he assumes his theory
capable of handling all forms of scientific explanation. Clearly, in its present
form it does not. Nevertheless, this lapse should not deter potential readers
from engaging this elegantly written, philosophically rich and innovative
account of scientific explanation. To claim that Strevens’ work is first-rate
is, quite simply, to understate the case.
ANTHONY J. KULIC
IHPST, University of Toronto
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